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System: Implications for Global Politics and 







As the current financial crisis unfolds around the world, China‘s 
newfound financial and political power is dominating global legal, 
financial, and political arenas. One recent incident illustrating 
China‘s growing clout occurred in October 2011, when Western 
media breathlessly reported that many ―European countries are 
looking for a lifeline to extricate themselves from the continent‘s 
severe sovereign debt crisis, which threatens to collapse the 
continent‘s financial system.‖1 The ―lifeline‖ these countries and 
banks were looking to was China.2  
As examples of China‘s rapidly expanding financial and political 
power emerge on a nearly daily basis, it is more critical than ever to 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
These remarks were inspired by my participation in the University of Maryland 2011 
International Law Symposium, China, Taiwan, and International Law: A Symposium in 
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu, October 5–6, 2011. I would like to thank the other 
symposium participants for their thoughtful contributions, especially Daniel C.K. Chow and 
Andy Y. Sun, my co-panelists on the Contemporary Perspectives on International Private 
Law Panel. In addition, I would like to thank Professors Carl Minzner, David Super, and 
David Gamage for their insightful feedback on these remarks, and the editors of the 
Maryland Journal of International Law, Jennifer Thompson, Emanwel Turnbull, and 
Catherine Gonzalez for their excellent research assistance. Also, I would like to thank the 
participants in the New Perspectives on Comparative Law Conference at The George 
Washington University Law School, on April 20, 2012, who provided invaluable feedback. 
 1. Barry Hatton, China Charms Europe, but Beijing Has Own Agenda, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9852405. See also Aaron Back 
& Esther Fung, China’s Wen Vague on Help for Europe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2011, at A13 
(noting that the European debt crisis has put new focus on a potential role for China and 
other developing economies to come to the aid of Western economies in trouble, but has also 
underlined the limits to any such scenario, and quoting Premier Wen as stating that ―China 
remains willing to expand its investment in the EU‖).  
 2. See supra note 1.  
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understand the depth and breadth of the current financial and political 
transformations occurring in China, and in particular the rapid 
reforms occurring in the Chinese banking system as the country seeks 
to assume the mantle of the world‘s new banker. Indeed, as one 
commentator has recently suggested, perhaps the  
most salient feature of the twentieth century so far has been 
China‘s emergence as a global force . . . . The world is 
going through a period of major development, reform and 
adjustment. With the growth of multi-polarization, and 
economic globalization, China and other emerging 
countries are clearly set to play much more important roles 
in the second decade of the 21st century. And there have 
been many predictions as to what this future world will 
look like.3  
These remarks, as set forth below, seek to begin a dialogue into 
what this new world may look like as global markets rapidly rise, fall, 
and transform, focusing on the rise of China in particular and the 
political and financial consequences of its recent and unprecedented 
path to power. First, these remarks discuss the massive changes that 
have transformed the Chinese banking system over the last two 
decades from a largely insular, state-run system to one that is moving 
to a more market-based economy.4 These remarks then proceed to 
elaborate how these changes have accelerated over the last decade, 
particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis.5 In analyzing 
the history of the Chinese banking transformation, these remarks 
discuss how and why China is moving in a direction contrary to that 
of most western regimes, as it moves from a more public banking 
system to a more privatized one.  
Ultimately, these remarks seek to further the global debate over 
the lessons that can be learned from the Chinese experience as China 
navigates the public/private divide in unique and distinctive ways. 
China‘s banking system has come to straddle the public/private 
 
 3. Zhaoxing Li, Setting the Record Straight on China’s Global Ambitions, EUROPE‘S 
WORLD, Autumn 2011, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Homeold/Article/tabid 
/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21907/language/en-US/Settingtherecordstraighton 
Chinasglobalambitions.aspx. 
 4. See Keith Bradsher, Vows of Support, and Persistent Anxiety: China Links 
Investment in Europe with Its Own Agenda for Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at B1.  
 5. See David Barboza, China’s Treasury Holdings Make U.S. Woes Its Own, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2011, at B1 (describing the measures the Chinese government is taking to 
ease structural imbalances in light of the global financial crisis, and in reaction to U.S. 
financial problems in particular).  
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divide in remarkably different ways than the American, European, 
and other market-based banking regimes it is competing with. In 
essence, China is charting its own path as it creates a new banking 
model—that is, developing a new banking model with ―Chinese 
characteristics.‖6  
As part of this examination, these remarks also briefly consider 
whether China is at the forefront of a new geopolitical 
development—a development that has been called the rise of new 
state capitalism. More specifically, one of the key questions facing 
the geo-political arena is whether a new form of market capitalism is 
emerging that explicitly embraces a strong state role, with China 
leading the way in this movement.7 One author has described this 
transition, and China‘s leading role in this transformation, as follows:  
[t]wenty years ago state firms were nothing more than parts 
of the government machine. Ten years ago, there was 
widespread doubt about whether they could succeed. Today 
they include some of the world‘s biggest companies, 
sucking up profits at home and taking on the world market 
with a will. Between 2005 and 2011, four of the world‘s top 
ten stockmarket flotations involved Chinese state 
companies (and collectively raised $64.5 billion).8  
These developments underscore the speed, breadth, and significance 
of China‘s banking reforms for the future of global market 
capitalism, and the necessity of studying these reforms in depth. 
 Yet another interesting angle of China‘s global impact lies in 
understanding how China‘s banking reforms have shored up its 
financial and political power, sometimes subtly and sometimes 
explicitly, at the expense of the United States, Europe, and Japan. Not 
surprisingly, as China has become the world‘s largest export 
economy, and U.S. dependence on Chinese exports and debt buying 
has increased dramatically,9 China‘s national pride has surged. This 
 
 6. Richard N. Cooper, Recent Books on International Relations, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 159, 161 (reviewing GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA‘S ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION (2002)). 
 7. See New Masters of the Universe, How State Enterprise Is Spreading, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 21, 2012, at 6, 6–8 (noting that varieties of state capitalism all have something in 
common: politicians have far more power than they do under liberal capitalism; for example, 
in authoritarian regimes, politicians can restructure entire industries at the stroke of a pen, 
although there are nevertheless limits even under these systems to the ―Leviathan‘s‖ power).  
 8. And the Winner Is. . ., ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, at 17–18. 
 9. See Barboza, supra note 5.  
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interesting, yet largely overlooked, strand of China‘s rise to greater 
financial power includes a greater willingness to critique the United 
States and contrast China‘s successes with perceived American 
weaknesses, as well as compare China‘s brand of market capitalism 
with that of the United States.10 These remarks therefore analyze 
several recent examples of how China has been able to use banking 
reforms to not only achieve greater financial and political power, but 
also to create a more prominent and confident global voice. Finally, 
these remarks conclude with a discussion of some of the lessons for 
the future that can be drawn from China‘s recent experiences, both 
for the current global financial crisis and for how such crises may be 
moderated in the future. 
I. THE FOUNDING OF A BANKING SYSTEM UNDER STRICT 
CENTRALIZED CONTROL 
China‘s moves towards market capitalism are relatively recent 
and remain controversial.11 These remarks thus begin by examining 
China‘s recent banking reforms with reference to its historical and 
cultural past, explaining how China developed a uniquely public and 
private banking system which has in part led China‘s fortunes to 
diverge from those of other major banking regimes during this time 
of financial crisis. 
China‘s modern banking system, as with much of its economy 
after the ascension of the Communist Party, was initially marked by 
state ownership and central planning.12 During the first decade of 
Communist rule, the government gave all control of banking and 
monetary policy to the People‘s Bank of China (PBOC), founded in 
1948.13 Over the next few decades, the Chinese government created 
three other state-owned commercial banks, the China Construction 
Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and 
 
 10. See Bob Davis & Aaron Back, China Slams U.S over Debt, WALL ST. J., July 29, 
2011, at C3 (discussing a ―sharply-worded commentary from China‘s state news agency‖ 
regarding a possible downgrade of U.S. debt, and noting that in ―some of the strongest 
language from China‘s government on the issue so far, one Xinhua article castigated U.S. 
leaders for putting the world economy in jeopardy and called on [U.S. leaders] to ‗show 
some sense of global responsibility‘‖). 
 11. See Bradsher, supra note 4 (noting that the European Union feels that China has yet 
to meet the WTO‘s criteria for a market economy and the pace of China‘s transition to a 
more market-oriented one is up to China, and therefore unpredictable). 
 12. Christopher D. Luehr, Red Banking: Chinese State-Owned Commercial Bank Reform 
and the Basel II Accord, 20 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 171, 174 (2011).  
 13. Duncan Alford, The Influence of Hong Kong Banking Law on Banking Reform in the 
PRC, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 35, 38 (2008); Luehr, supra note 12, at 174.  
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Commercial Banks of China (these three banks, along with the 
PBOC, are also known as ―The Big Four‖).14  
Unlike banking systems in the United States and Europe, during 
this time China‘s banks did not actually pool savings or act as risk 
managers.15 Instead, the banks primarily functioned as state credit-
granting agencies, and their principal purpose was to fund the Central 
Planning Committee‘s programs.16 During this period, the central 
government controlled the corporate governance of the banks (much 
as it dominated the corporate governance of all domestic companies 
at this time).17  
While this consolidation of power allowed the Central Planning 
Committee to act quickly and decisively with respect to banking and 
monetary policies and programs, it also created significant problems 
that impeded bank efficiency and growth, echoing the experiences of 
other centrally planned economies during that historical period.18 
Such problems included a lack of discipline with respect to banking 
policies as well as reduced incentives to maximize economic 
efficiency.19  
More specific problems included political pressure on banks, 
which resulted in bank managers approving highly risky loans in 
exchange for political favors.20 Bank managers believed that the 
government would issue more loans or otherwise bail out the banks if 
 
 14. Luehr, supra note 12, at 174. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. See, e.g., Peter Ferdinand, Russian and Soviet Shadows over China’s Future?, 68 
INT‘L AFF. 279, 280 (1992) (noting that when China implemented its first five-year plan 
between 1953 and 1957 it was consciously following the Soviet model of development and 
its establishment of a centrally planned economy); Brian Sawers, Reevaluating the Evidence 
for Anticommons in Transition Russia, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 251 (2010) (recognizing 
that corruption often arises as a response to the inefficiencies within centrally planned 
economies); K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulations in China and their Corporate 
Finance Implications on State Enterprise Reform, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1996). 
Wong notes that:  
Viewed broadly, China‘s [current] reform movement is a direct response to the 
gross inefficiency that prevailed within the planned economy. In many ways, 
China‘s current problems with its state sector are similar to those encountered 
in Russia and Eastern Europe. Years of directives from static state planning and 
a complete lack of competition have led to bloated bureaucratic management 
structures and obsolete manufacturing facilities. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 19. See Luehr, supra note 12, at 175. 
 20. Id. 
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they ran into any significant economic trouble, creating a structural 
disincentive for bank employees to maximize economic efficiency, 
innovation, or profits.21 Moreover, at the time, corporate management 
in China was not subject to western-style fiduciary duty rules22 which 
impeded efforts against corruption and self-dealing.23  
As these problems grew, the Chinese government began to 
rethink its policies, and decided to begin liberalizing its banking 
system. As a result, in the late 1970s, the Chinese government 
embarked on a far-reaching set of reforms aimed at moving away 
from a centrally planned system to one that began to embrace free 
trade and liberal economic principles.24 Significantly, China‘s 
reforms were motivated both by a desire to open up its markets as 
well as an explicit desire to ―build a stronger nation.‖25 
II. A SHIFT TOWARD OPENNESS IN THE CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM 
China began to change its banking and economic systems in 
1978 during the ―Opening Up‖ period under Deng Xiaopeng.26 
During this time, China began to gingerly privatize its banking 
system, allowing banks greater authority to manage their businesses 
and lending.27 Between 1978 and 1986, China‘s reforms slowly 
carved out a more limited role for the PBOC, created three additional 
state banks,28 and allowed banks more autonomy over their business 
dealings, enabling them to expand and set up local branches 
throughout the country. These ―incremental reform[s] ushered in the 
first wave of Chinese economic growth, during which industries and 
banks flung off the shackles of government control,‖ at least 
 
 21. Id.  
 22. Chinese law did not impose Western-style fiduciary duties upon corporate 
management until 2006, when China‘s PRC Company Law went into effect. The Company 
Law of 2006 fundamentally revised the country‘s corporate law, with the aim of improving 
―the operational efficiency of Chinese companies and serve the development of Chinese 
capital markets.‖ Craig Anderson & Bingna Guo, Corporate Governance Under the New 
Company Law (Part 1): Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder Protection, CHINA L. & 
PRAC., Apr. 2006, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1692150/Channel/9949/ 
Corporate-Governance-under-the-New-Company-Law-Part-1-Fiduciary-Duties-and-
Minority-Shareholder.html. 
 23. Luehr, supra note 12, at 175.  
 24. Id. at 175–76.  
 25. Id. at 175 (citing NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994)).  
 26. Luehr, supra note 12, at 175.  
 27. Id. at 176. 
 28. See supra Part I (discussing the formation of the ―Big Four‖ banks).  
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tentatively.29 The Chinese government soon realized, however, that it 
could not truly move further towards a free (or ―free-er‖) enterprise 
system by only tinkering with the existing state-run banking system. 
Rather, a new banking framework was required.30  
Consequently, in 1986, the Chinese government took its first 
steps towards creating a new legal framework for its banking system, 
issuing ―Provisional Regulations on the Control of Banks,‖ the first 
comprehensive regulation aimed at the Chinese banking industry.31 
The government intended to develop a framework that would serve to 
allow the country to move towards a more market-based system 
which would give businesses more freedom, yet still allow the 
government to maintain strong control.32 
During the remainder of the decade and into the 1990s, China 
grew economically and expanded its political influence. As China 
began liberalizing and privatizing more rapidly, and China‘s banks 
gained more freedom to lend in furtherance of economic efficiency 
and productivity (as opposed to serving other political ends), the ―Big 
Four‖ banks quickly realized that they needed to reform and further 
modernize their internal banking structures and practices.33 
Reinforcing this push for reform was China‘s stated goal of accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).34 To aid these goals and 
reduce the number of nonperforming loans at local branches 
(primarily due to policy-based lending practices), the government 
passed another set of banking reforms in the mid-1990s: The Law of 
the People‘s Republic of China on the People‘s Bank of China and 
the Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Commercial 
Banking.35 These laws successfully addressed agency problems at the 
local branches, but were otherwise broadly and vaguely drafted and 
failed to adequately address corporate governance issues at the 
national banks.36  
When the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997, however, China 
took heed of the problems its neighbors were facing and decided that 
it needed to further reform its banking system in order to avoid 
 
 29. Luehr, supra note 12, at 176.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 176.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 176–77. 
 34. Id. at 177. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
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similarly debilitating crises.37 In 1998, China recapitalized the Big 
Four banks, primarily due to the large amount of nonperforming 
loans they held.38 China created an asset management company for 
each of the Big Four, which took over the approximately $170 billion 
in nonperforming loans.39 Also in 1998, the government separated the 
securities, insurance, and banking supervisory structures in the 
PBOC.40 During this period, China‘s most successful reform was 
replacing its old credit-planning system with the asset liability 
management system as broadly described above.41 China also 
improved its banks‘ capital adequacy by complying with the Basel 
Committee‘s International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (Basel II).42 In doing so, China was also able to 
increase its credibility with WTO members, a critical step towards its 
entry into the WTO.43  
III. CHINA LEAPS FORWARD BY ACCEDING TO THE WTO 
Although China had first begun to open its banking system to 
foreign banks in a limited manner in 1991, WTO accession 
compelled China to further liberalize its banking system.44 
Essentially, as part of the accession process, China was required to 
make a broad range of concessions to the other members of the WTO 
who wanted greater access to the Chinese banking industry, 
especially the United States, the European Community, Japan, 
Australia, and Canada.45 These reforms are also notable because they 
were externally, rather than internally driven—during this period, 
China was essentially forced to enact liberalizing reforms in order to 
comply with its international obligations.46 
When China acceded to the WTO in December 2001, it pledged 
to fully liberalize foreign access to its domestic banking services 
 
 37. Id. at 177–78; Alford, supra note 13, at 39. 
 38. Alford, supra note 13, at 39. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Luehr, supra note 12, at 178. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Ge Jianguo, WTO and Revision of China’s Foreign Banking Regulations, 124 
BANKING L.J. 536, 536–37 (2007).  
 45. Id.  
 46. See generally Icksoo Kim, Accession into the WTO: External Pressure for Internal 
Reforms in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 433 (2002).  
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market over a five-year period.47 Under the WTO requirements, 
China was required to allow foreign financial services institutions to 
supply banking services in accordance with the terms set out in its 
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS)48 schedule.49 
China‘s GATS schedule stated that with respect to sectors 
covered by banking commitments, ―[w]ithin five years after 
accession foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide 
services to all Chinese clients,‖ as well as foreign clients, through a 
―commercial presence‖ in China.50 These foreign financial 
institutions were supposed to be permitted to provide services in the 
form of, inter alia, bank deposits, various types of lending, and 
payment and money transmissions.51 China‘s commitment to allow 
foreign banks to enter the Chinese banking services market through a 
―commercial presence‖ included allowing foreign entities to 
constitute new banks, acquire existing banking institutions, and, 
importantly, gave foreign entities the ability to maintain 
establishments in China without limitations on corporate form or 
foreign capital participation.52 China was also required to eliminate 
any ―non-prudential measures restricting ownership, operation, and 
juridical form of foreign financial institutions, including on internal 
branching and licenses‖ as well as any remaining geographic 
restrictions on banking services.53  
While some of these goals have been met or are in the process of 
implementation, others remain to be fulfilled despite the completion 
of China‘s five-year transition period.54 During the transition period, 
however, the push to comply with the commitments it made to secure 
WTO accession led China to rapidly accelerate its reforms aimed at 
liberalization and modernization of the banking system. For example, 
in 2003, China created the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), which assumed critical PBOC regulatory functions, 
 
 47. Daniel C. Crosby, Banking on China’s WTO Commitments: ‘Same Bed, Different 
Dreams’ in China’s Financial Services Sector, 11 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 75, 81 (2008).  
 48. Id. 
 49. See Ministerial Conference Report, Report on the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2, at 30, 35–36 (2001) [hereinafter GATS Schedule]; World 
Trade Org., Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of China, Pt. II, 103 
WT/L/432 (2001) (incorporating China‘s GATS schedule). 
 50. Crosby, supra note 47, at 83–84 (quoting GATS Schedule, supra note 49, at 34–35). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 84.  
 53. GATS Schedule, supra note 49, at 34–35.  
 54. Crosby, supra note 47, at 104.  
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including regulating banks, Asset Management Companies (AMCs), 
and trust and investment companies, and generally helped maintain a 
stable financial system. Also in 2003, the Chinese government 
recapitalized the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank in 
preparation for listing the banks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(the listings were ultimately completed in 2005).55 In addition, in 
2004, China amended its commercial banking laws and allowed 
London bank HSBC to invest in the Bank of Communications—the 
―largest equity investment in a Chinese bank since 1949.‖56  
The Bank of China conducted its initial public offering (IPO) on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in mid-2006. In October of that year 
(after the government recapitalized it with $50 billion), the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China conducted its IPO on the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai stock exchanges; at the time, this offering constituted 
the world‘s largest IPO.57  
On the same day that China‘s five-year transitional period ended, 
China also implemented the Regulations of the People‘s Republic of 
China for the Administration of Foreign Investment Banks (New 
Regulations) and their implementing rules (New Rules).58 These rules 
were aimed at allowing foreign countries or banking entities to enter 
the Chinese market, though in a highly constrained manner.59 The 
 
 55. Alford, supra note 13, at 40.  
 56. Id. Notably, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China‘s IPO no longer holds the 
world record for the largest single stock offering—that record was surpassed in 2010, 
interestingly, by the Agricultural Bank of China, which conducted the world‘s largest first-
time share sale in 2010 with an initial public offering of $22.1 billion. See Jamil Anderlini, 
State Share Prop-up Makes AgBank Largest Listing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at 9.  
 57. Alford, supra note 13, at 41 (citing Keri Greiger, ICBC Makes Strong Debut in Hong 
Kong, Shanghai, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at B5).  
 58. Ge Jianguo, supra note 44, at 536. 
 59. A World Bank working paper gives an apt summary of the scope and impact of these 
changes: 
Under the 1994 commitments, foreign banks could only operate in specified 
regions, accept deposits only from non-residents, and only in foreign currencies 
(with some exceptions), and make no loans to Chinese citizens. On accession, 
geographic and client limitations will be eliminated for foreign currency 
businesses. Even though the schedule states that on accession, local currency 
businesses will be allowed in four cities, (Shanghai, Shenzen, Tianjin, and 
Dailian) there seems to be a binding restriction on clients which will only be 
relaxed in two years. The entire banking sector [was to have been] fully 
liberalized by 2006. As in the case of insurance, licenses are to be awarded 
solely on the basis of prudential criteria with no quantitative limitations or 
economic needs tests applied.  
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New Regulations restrict the scope of activities that can be conducted 
by foreign banks seeking to operate in China through branches 
instead of through subsidiaries.60 In particular, foreign bank branches 
can only take domestic currency deposits of one million renminbi or 
more from Chinese individuals and cannot make local currency loans 
to Chinese individuals.61 Moreover, foreign bank branches cannot 
issue domestic currency credit cards to Chinese enterprises or 
Chinese individuals.62 These restrictions have generated a great deal 
of concern from other members of the WTO, including the United 
States, who feel that China has not fulfilled its WTO commitments (a 
view that continues to this day).63  
Another significant development occurred in 2007, when the 
CBRC issued The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New 
Basel Accord by China‘s Banking Sector (Basel II Guidelines).64 The 
Basel II Guidelines require full implementation of the entire Basel II 
 
Aaditya Mattoo, China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Services 
Dimension 9 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2932, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636294.  
 60. Article 8 imposes overall and branch level minimum capital requirements. 
Regulations of the People‘s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-invested 
Banks, art. 8 (promulgated by the State Council of the People‘s Republic of China, Nov. 8. 
2006, effective Dec. 11, 2006), http://sg2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinalaw/investment 
/200801/20080105317514.html [hereinafter New Regulations]. Banks must have maintained 
a representative office in the PRC for at least two years in order to open a branch. Id. art. 12. 
New businesses must go through a two-stage application process. Id. arts. 15, 18. Some of 
the restrictions are set out in China Eases Restrictions on Foreign Retail Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/business/worldbusiness/16ihtrules.3561 
880.html. 
 61. See New Regulations, supra note 60, art. 31 (listing the activities that banks may carry 
out). See also China Opens RMB Retail Business to Foreign Banks from 11 December 2006, 
KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.mallesons.com/publications/ 
marketAlerts/2006/Documents/8696677w.htm. 
 62. These restrictions appear to be loosening, as recently China has indicated that it may 
open its markets to credit cards. See Jennifer F. Friedman, China Nod for Citibank Credit 
Cards May Show Market Opening, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 6, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-06/nod-for-citibank-s-credit-cards-may-signal-
chinese-banking-market-opening.html. See also Mark Drajem & Peter Eichenbaum, U.S. 
Goes After China at WTO as Pressure Mounts from Congress, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 16, 
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/u-s-set-to-file-wto-complaints-against-
china-as-pressure-grows-over-trade.html. 
 63. See Friedman, supra note 62 (―The U.S. says the rules contravene a pledge the 
world‘s most populous nation made when it joined the . . . WTO in 2001 to open its debit- 
and credit-card markets to foreign processors . . . .‖). See also Drajem & Eichenbaum, supra 
note 62 (reporting on the two WTO complaints filed by the United States against China 
regarding payment-processing and steel duties).  
 64. The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China‘s Banking 
Sector (promulgated by China Banking Regulation Comm‘n, Nov. 14, 2007), 
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/e/2007-11-14/10319.shtml. 
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framework by all large banks with operational entities in other 
countries or regions, or with a large proportion of international 
business. The Basel II Guidelines warn that State-Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) should refrain from ―irrationally 
rushing into the [sic] implementation‖65 of Basel II and that 
―implementation of Basel II . . . should be [conducted] gradually.‖66 
Instead of translating the provisions into separate regulations, the 
Basel II Guidelines encourage SOCBs to implement Basel II as a 
whole.67  
The Basel II Guidelines essentially provided large-scale banks 
with operational entities in other countries or regions, or with a large 
proportion of international business, until 2013 to implement Basel 
II.68 However, China exceeded the expectations of its own guidelines 
when it announced that Chinese banks were likely to carry out its 
Basel II obligations by the end of 2010;69 this announcement may be 
an indication of the strength of China‘s economic growth, or simply 
reflect its ambitions.70  
Indeed, the question of why China accelerated implementation of 
these requirements, particularly during the midst of a global financial 
crisis, is an interesting one, and it is worth watching how China 
proceeds in this respect in both the long and short-term. 
Around this time the Chinese government also recognized the 
emergence of a global economic power vacuum, which it sought to 
fill in order to achieve greater global prominence.71 On a more 
instrumental level, China was also trying to learn the lessons of the 
past and create an economic system that could combine the best of 
both market-based and central control.72 Each of these issues is 
discussed below.  
 
 
 65. Id. pt. II.ii.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. pt. III.i.  
 68. Id. pt. V.iii. 
 69. Luehr, supra note 12, at 193. At the present time, it is unclear whether China has 
succeeded in fulfilling its Basel II obligations.  
 70. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  
 71. See supra Part II.  
 72. See supra Part II. 
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IV. CHINA‘S MOVE FROM A PUBLIC TO A PRIVATIZED BANKING 
MODEL 
As country after country felled by the current financial crisis 
turns towards greater public control over its banking system,73 China 
seems to be almost unique in moving in the opposite direction. 
Indeed, China seems to be speeding up the privatization of its 
banking system in the wake of the global financial crisis.74  
As China moves closer to a privatized banking model, its 
successes and failures are well worth further analysis. First, the speed 
of China‘s recent reforms should not be underestimated. I was able to 
witness the breathtaking pace of change in China firsthand. In 2010 
and 2011, I traveled to China as part of a research team and 
conducted interviews with banking officials, analyzed data on 
structural and practical reforms in the banking sector, and observed 
how China was attempting to transform its banking system from one 
that suffered from unevenness in practice, liquidity, and loan 
performance into one that was beginning to implement strong 
corporate governance principles that echoed, and often matched, 
those in the United States and Europe.75 For example, in just one year 
between 2010 and 2011, Chinese banks began to form trade 
associations and identify best practices, often based on international 
models, and rapidly changed from a system tentatively moving 
towards reform to one that appeared to enthusiastically embrace 
Western-style management and prudential practices.76  
 
 73. Hatton, supra note 1 (mentioning austerity measures and public calls for 
improvements). See generally Horst Loechel & Helena Xiang Li, China’s Changing Model 
of Banking (EU-China Bus. Mgmt. Training Project, Working Paper No. 010, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1718166 (saying that belief 
in the Western model of banking has been shaken).  
 74. See Barboza, supra note 5 (describing the measures the Chinese government is 
taking to ease structural imbalances in light of the global financial crisis and U.S. financial 
problems).  
 75.  See International Clinic Advances Justice Around the World, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS 
KING CAREY SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features 
/intlclinic.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012); Zdenek Kudrna, Banking Reform in China 
Driven by International Standards and Chinese Specifics 15 (TIGER Working Paper No. 
109, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026854 
(describing governance reforms); Garcia-Herrero et al., China’s Banking Reform: An 
Assessment of Its Evolution and Possible Impact, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 304, 312 (2005) 
(discussing weak corporate governance and improvements made thereto). Cf. Kwan Chi 
Hung, Reform of China’s State-owned Banks a Success, NOMURA J. CAP. MARKETS, Winter 
2009, at 1, 1–2 (stating that corporate governance has improved). 
 76. See, e.g., Introduction of CAM, CHINA ASS‘N OF MICROFINANCE, 
http://en.chinamfi.net/pub/LIT_6.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (describing the experiences 
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Another key aspect of China‘s recent transformations is that 
many of China‘s recent banking and financial reforms have a Chinese 
twist—for example, China has imposed higher and more stringent 
deposit requirements than the United States.77 In addition, as of 
January 2011, while China had still not formally implemented a 
deposit insurance system, it did acknowledge the importance of 
quickly implementing one, and claims it is ―on track‖ to do so.78 In 
lieu of a formal deposit insurance system, ―the government acts as a 
de facto insurer for deposits in China‘s domestic banks.‖79 China‘s 
moves towards implementation of a formal deposit insurance system 
are also significant because deposit insurance is often implemented in 
response to economic crises or to prepare for or avoid an economic 
crisis or depression.80 In this light, it will be important to closely 
observe how China‘s reforms in this area unfold. 
Notably, China‘s economic reforms have also corresponded with 
a significant rise in its global power and a resurgence of national 
pride. China‘s growing financial and political might has led global 
leaders and commentators to ask whether China is on the verge of 
becoming a global financial leader, and perhaps even the world‘s 
global financial leader.81 Or is it, like many other countries, in danger 
of a spectacular economic collapse? Accurately assessing China‘s 
immediate economic future is difficult, not least because China is 
known for its lack of transparency and operation by government 
fiat.82 Nonetheless, many analysts laud China‘s gains and predict its 
impending world dominance. For example, from an outside 
perspective, China appears to be following an age-old path from 
financial dominance to political dominance.83 China is also poised to 
 
of the China Microcredit Foundation (CAM), which grew exponentially during the years 
2005 to 2010, and by 2010 began to emulate and implement Western-style banking 
structures). 
 77. Daniel L. McCullough, Feeling the Stones: Measuring the Potential of Deposit 
Insurance in China, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 445 (2007). See also China Widens Reserve 
Ratio to Limit Inflation, Analysts Say, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 28, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-28/china-may-limit-inflation-with-reserve-ratio-
move-locking-up-140-billion.html (discussing the extension of the reserve requirements).  
 78. Wiang Xiotlan, Deposit Insurance System to Be Introduced, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 8, 
2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201101/08/content_11812713.htm. 
 79. Id. See also McCullough, supra note 77, at 424. 
 80. McCullough, supra note 77, at 430.  
 81. See Peirs Brendon, For China, Will Money Bring Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2010, at WK9. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Zhiyong Lan et al., The Growing China and Its Prospective Role in World 
Affairs, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 43, 43–44 (1999) (discussing various responses to China‘s 
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surpass Japan as the world‘s second largest economy, representing a 
significant shift in the balance of global economic and political 
power.84 Indeed, some have argued that this shift shows that ―China‘s 
ascendance is for real, and that the rest of the world will have to 
reckon with a new economic superpower‖—one that is second only 
to the United States.85  
However, China‘s financial picture is not entirely golden. As 
noted above, China still lacks a secure deposit system—which was a 
key factor in smoothing some of the wobbles of European and 
American banking systems.86 Furthermore, a number of analysts have 
noted that China‘s economic growth is slowing (from 10% in 2010 to 
9% in 2012).87 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently 
concluded a review of the Chinese banking system and reported that 
Chinese banks were vulnerable to heavy losses due to a rise in off-
balance-sheet liabilities and a housing boom.88 The IMF also pointed 
out that the Chinese system was becoming more complex, 
intertwined with other markets, and that informal credit markets and 
off-balance-sheet activities are on the rise.89 Moreover, some analysts 
feel that despite their recent gains and successes, China‘s banks are 
insufficiently capitalized to be able to ―move from where they are 
now to something else.‖90  
At the same time, while these issues pose concerns for China‘s 
growth and power, most analysts believe that China has heeded the 
lessons of the countries whose housing markets have recently 
collapsed and has begun acting proactively to address the risk of 
economic bubbles, raising rates and increasing the cost of 
 
rapid growth, including speculations that China may be pursuing an imperialistic agenda, 
and contending that China‘s modernization in combination with the size of its economy 
could have profound historical and global ramifications).  
 84. Lindsay Whipp & Jamil Anderlini, Chinese Economy Eclipses Japan’s, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/935zc446-a8d7-22df-86ee-00144eabdc0.htn 
#axzz1dQPY9mF8. 
 85. David Barboza, China Overtakes Japan to Become No. 2 Global Economic Power, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1. 
 86. McCullough, supra note 77, at 422. See also Xiotlan, supra note 78.  
 87. Kenneth Rapoza, China’s Housing Bubble Past, and Its Future, FORBES, Nov. 8, 
2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/11/08/chinas-housing-bubble-past-and-
its-future/. 
 88. Alan Hawkes, IMF Sounds Warning for Chinese Banking System, GUARDIAN, Nov. 
15, 2011, http:///www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/15/imf-warning-chinese-baking-
system.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Nathan Vardi, Red Banks Rising: Will China Become the World’s Banker?, FORBES, 
May 7, 2012, at 124, 126.  
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borrowing—the very opposite of what the United States did at the 
beginning of the recent housing crisis.91 In other words, thus far 
China‘s credit-tightening efforts may allow it to avoid a hard landing 
from its housing bubble and other potential economic problems, and 
thereby prevent China‘s economic fortunes from sinking too far.92  
Nonetheless, there are a number of political and financial 
concerns which may slow China‘s rise. As noted above, the Chinese 
system suffers from a lack of transparency, making it difficult to 
gather and analyze hard data.93 The Chinese judiciary also lacks 
complete independence, and no express legal or constitutional 
provisions authorize citizen suits again government entities.94 It is 
important to note, however, that China does appear to recognize and 
is attempting to address some of these issues.95  
Despite these concerns, overall China still appears to be heading 
toward global financial and economic leadership, as discussed below.  
V. GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA‘S BANKING TRANSFORMATION 
Joseph Schumpeter once stated that ―[t]he monetary system of a 
people reflects everything that the nation wants, does, suffers, is.‖96 
This quote is just as relevant to China now as it was when 
 
 91. Id.  
 92. Afraid of a Bump: China’s Economy is Set to Suffer Hardship But Not the Hard 
Landing that Many Fear, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 49 (arguing that despite the 
existence of bad debts, the central government can afford to bail out the lower tiers of 
government and the banks they borrowed from, or banks could underpay their depositors).  
 93. See SUSAN KRAUSE BELL & HOWARD CHAO, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA: RISKS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 3, 27 (2010). See also 
Nathaniel Flannery, The Great Wall: How Transparency Problems and Governance Risk Are 




 94. See generally Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 
(2011). 
 95. Id. See also Peter Lorentzen et al., Transparent Authoritarianism? An Analysis of 
Political and Economic Barriers to Greater Government Transparency in China 1–2 (APSA 
2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1643986 (―China‘s government has taken significant steps to increase the access 
of ordinary people to government-collected information . . . toward increasing openness and 
facilitating more-responsive government at many levels.‖); Liang Ma & Jiannan Wu, What 
Drives Fiscal Transparency? Evidence from Provincial Governments in China 2–3 (1st 
Global Conference on Transparency Research, Rutgers Univ.–Newark, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1807767 (recognizing some transparency reforms). 
 96. Edward Carr, Europe and Its Currency: Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 
2011, at 61.  
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Schumpeter first stated it in the context of other developing countries. 
While outwardly China appears to be a largely inflexible 
authoritarian regime, from the inside the Chinese people appear to be 
seeking economic progress, power, and a meaningful place on the 
world stage—efforts which again seem to be tied to resurgence in 
Chinese national pride.97 Currently, it looks as though the global 
financial crisis has provided China with an unprecedented 
opportunity to muster its strengths—high levels of reserves, high 
savings rates, and an increasingly educated populace—and parlay 
them into global strength while the fortunes of the United States and 
Europe wane.98  
For instance, while on the surface China appears to be simply 
satisfying its global commitments and modernizing its banking 
system to spur growth, a deeper analysis suggests that China is 
capitalizing on the relative strength of its economy and banking 
system to further strengthen its global position. Indeed, it is perhaps 
not entirely coincidental that China is on now track to surpass Japan 
as the world‘s second largest economy, and is rapidly closing in on 
the United States.99 
As the Schumpeter quote above highlights, monetary systems 
and banking reforms can be highly intertwined with a nation‘s 
political and social goals. China currently provides a paradigmatic 
example of such a situation. For instance, as China attempts to step in 
to assist other countries suffering financial crises, many have argued 
that China is actually ―increasingly trying to diversify its foreign 
policy relationships‖ and ―trying to find the right ways to use [and 
gain from] its new-found influence.‖100 In fact, commentators argue 
that China‘s ―strategy‖ is increasingly becoming clear: ―[i]t wants to 
use its economic leverage to make friends who may be more 
forgiving in disputes over trade and human rights, and ensure doors 
are open for its goods and corporate investments‖ in its main export 
markets.101  
 
 97. See generally Sheng Ding, Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing’s 
National Image Management in the Age of China’s Rise, 46 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 293 
(2011).  
 98. See Michael Pettis, Unimpressed with China’s High Reserve and GDP Growth 
Numbers, SEEKING ALPHA (July 16, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com?article/149243-
unimpressed-with-China-hish-reserve-and-gdp-growth.  
 99. Brendon, supra note 81. 
 100. Hatton, supra note 1 (quoting Nicholas Consonery, an Asia analyst at Eurasia Group in 
Washington, D.C.). 
 101. Id.  
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As China steps up its role in the global financial arena, China is 
gaining not only political and financial power, but an important sense 
of pride and international confidence. This confidence, in fact, 
appears to rise in almost direct proportion to the missteps of the 
United States and other major financial powers. As one commentator 
put it, ―[t]he narrative that China has been financing the United States 
has taken hold in China . . . . If the U.S. is seen as irresponsibly using 
that money, that won‘t go down well in China.‖102 Furthermore, as 
debates over the most prudent or potentially successful banking and 
monetary policies intensify in the global arena, ―[t]he highly 
publicized and contentious nature of this debate is an additional nail 
in the coffin of Chinese perception of the United States as a 
stabilizing force and responsible actor in global economic affairs.‖103 
In this light, another fascinating issue to consider is how China will 
seek to use this moral as well as financial power. Recently, China has 
begun to use this power to publicly scold the United States for its 
perceived excesses and profligate spending.104 
New examples of China‘s rising economic and political 
influence emerge on nearly a daily basis.105 Again, unraveling the 
complexities of China‘s current policies and actions is vital to 
understanding both the true nature of the banking reforms currently 
occurring in China and whether China‘s economic power will 
continue to grow. In particular, understanding the transformations in 
China‘s banking system is imperative for any detailed assessment of 
their implications both for the global banking system and for China‘s 
prospects for enhancing its financial and political power on the world 
stage. As many have noted, China is asserting greater political and 
economic influence in Africa and Latin America106 and has at least 
the potential to surpass the United States as the world‘s largest 
economy. As the United States increasingly assumes the mantle of 
the world‘s debtor, and China emerges as the world‘s creditor, it 
 
 102. Davis & Back, supra note 10 (quoting Brookings Institution China scholar Eswar 
Prasad).  
 103. Id. 
 104. E.g., Nina Mandell, China Scolds US Government: Learn to Live Within Your 
Means, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-
06/news/29878509_1_credit-downgrade-debt-ceiling-structural-debt-problems.  
 105. See Vardi, supra note 90 (―In February [2012] China‘s central bank issued a three-
step plan that would tear down the barriers surrounding China‘s big banks. Hopes quickly 
emerged that China‘s banks could become international players much like China‘s industrial 
companies, providing capital to a global economy that needs it.‖)  
 106. See Whipp & Anderlini, supra note 84.  
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appears that the relative futures of U.S. and Chinese dominance, 
though intertwined, are highly uncertain and unpredictable.  
These remarks are intended to set the stage for greater dialogue 
over China‘s recent rise to global political and financial prominence. 
These remarks intentionally pose provocative questions about the 
implications of China‘s banking transformation for China‘s and the 
world‘s geopolitical and financial future. While an in-depth analysis 
of these issues is beyond the scope of these remarks, I hope that these 
remarks will provide fodder for future debates, and offer some 
critical information and background for future research on the 
implications of China‘s rise to power. I plan to address these 
questions more fully in my future work, and I invite other scholars 
and commentators to join me in this endeavor. Hopefully, these 
remarks have identified some of the major questions that are worthy 
of further study through academic and diplomatic dialogue.  
CONCLUSION  
Today, many countries, scholars, and key financial and political 
players are proposing a myriad of ―solutions‖ to the financial 
problems and crises spreading around the world. These remarks argue 
for broadening the dialogue over the range of potential solutions to 
include attention to systems such as China‘s, where innovative or 
unprecedented solutions may ultimately emerge. In addition, these 
remarks have sought to demonstrate that China is not merely 
modernizing its banking systems for its own sake or to maximize 
profits but also is seeking leverage through banking reform to 
increase its might on the world stage. In essence, what started out as a 
domestic modernization effort has rapidly become a tool in China‘s 
arsenal as it seeks greater, if not dominant, global financial and 
political power, with significant implications for the rest of the world.  
These remarks have suggested that this happened both because 
of China‘s recent economic successes as it has accelerated its banking 
reforms, and because these reforms have coincided with the distress 
of other major financial regimes. In this light, learning as much as 
possible from China‘s successes in moving from a more public, state-
controlled system to a more liberalized free market system is vital to 
understanding the future of global financial reform as well as aiding 
the task of identifying best practices. The task of unraveling the 
causalities between China‘s reforms, its growing political clout, and 
the global financial crisis is highly complex, absolutely necessary, 
and worth a great deal of future study.  
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In addition, China‘s moves towards a ―New State Capitalism‖ 
could herald the emergence of a new global market system, or they 
could simply fizzle into simply another historically contingent and 
brief financial or societal movement. Since China too may soon face 
some sort of financial crisis, whether China successfully develops a 
new and vibrant form of state capitalism will be a critical question 
over the next few years. We must study such developments closely 
for insights as to how likely China is to weather coming financial 
storms, and whether it may develop new and innovative solutions to 
current financial malaises. We also should watch closely to see 
whether China heeds the recent lessons from other countries currently 
facing financial crisis and seeks to offer lessons of its own. In this 
light, observing China‘s next steps will be both fascinating and 
highly instructive as other countries struggle to recover from recent 
financial crisis. Ultimately, I hope these remarks have set forth 
interesting and potentially fruitful avenues for further research, as 
well as provided a taste of the massive changes China is currently 
pursuing at local, national, and global levels.  
 
